This article discusses CLF v. Exxon Mobil, and the legal rule in conflict before the court: the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction (DPJ). The DPJ raises an important legal issue faced by courts in climate adaptation lawsuits for deciding which authority has the appropriate jurisdiction to resolve disputes at every stage of the lawsuit. In CLF v. Exxon Mobil, the DPJ was applied by the district court and a stay order was initially granted in favor of Exxon, deferring the matter to the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”). On CLF’s appeal, the First Circuit reversed the stay and held that the DPJ was inapplicable.
This article closely examines the standard of review employed by the First Circuit in reviewing the District Court’s decision to stay the proceedings. Thereafter, it critically analyzes the First Circuit’s reasoning on its determination regarding the non-application of the DPJ which led to the removal of the stay order. The article argues that the First Circuit did not adequately analyze certain factors, the Blackstone factors, while rightly concluding that the stay was improper. It further discusses the relevance of the decision within the development of legal jurisprudence on the appellate standard of review. It also discusses the DPJ’s use and application under the citizen suit provisions in federal environmental statutes, particularly the potential misuse of the DPJ by defendants. It further examines the overall impact of the case, identifies emerging judicial trends around limiting agency deference, and discusses how the potential impact of this lawsuit fits into the broader narrative.
